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Abstract
A seller wishes to prevent the discovery of rival o¤ers by its prospective customers.
We study sales techniques which serve this purpose by making it harder for a customer
to return to buy later after a search for alternatives. These include making an
exploding o¤er, o¤ering a buy-nowdiscount, or requiring payment of a deposit in
order to buy later. It is unilaterally protable for a seller to deter search under mild
conditions, but sellers can su¤er when all do so. In a monopoly setting where the
buyer has an uncertain outside option, the optimal selling mechanism features both
buy-now discounts and deposit contracts. When a seller cannot commit to its policy,
it exploits the inference that those consumers who try to buy later have no good
alternative. In many cases the outcome then involves exploding o¤ers, so that no
consumers return to buy after search.
Keywords: Consumer search, sales techniques, price discrimination, sequential
screening.
1 Introduction
A seller would usually like to discourage the investigation of rival o¤ers by its prospective
customers, in case a better deal is discovered elsewhere. This paper examines one way a
seller may be able to do this, which is to make it harder or more costly for a customer
to return to buy later, after a search for alternative o¤ers. When post-search purchase
is made articially di¢ cult, this reduces a consumers payo¤ from searching, and thereby
This paper replaces an earlier working paper titled Exploding o¤ers and buy-now discounts. We
are grateful for helpful comments to Marco Haan, Hao Li, Alessandro Pavan, Andrew Rhodes, Roland
Strausz, John Vickers, Glen Weyl, and Asher Wolinsky.
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encourages immediate purchase. A seller can make it harder for a customer to buy later by
making an exploding o¤er, where a customer will not be served if she does not buy during
the initial sales encounter, by o¤ering a buy-nowdiscount, where a customer is o¤ered
a discount only if she buys on her rst encounter, or by requiring the customer to pay a
deposit to be able to buy later.
Anecdotes. Because inducements for quick decisions may be o¤ered casually during the
course of a one-to-one sales encounter, it is hard to obtain empirical evidence about their
use. In his account of sales practices, Cialdini (2001, page 208) provides examples of ex-
ploding o¤ers: A prospective health-club member or automobile buyer might learn that
the deal o¤ered by the salesperson is good for that one time only; should the customer
leave the premises the deal is o¤. [...] A door-to-door magazine solicitor might say that
salespeople are in the customers area for just a day; after that, they, and the customers
chance to buy their magazine package, will be long gone.1 A home vacuum cleaner oper-
ation I inltrated instructed its sales trainees to claim that, I have so many other people
to see that I have the time to visit a family only once. Its company policy that even if
you decide later that you want this machine, I cant come back and sell it to you.In a
labor market context, Roth and Xing (1994, page 1001) discuss high-pressure job o¤ers.
For instance, judges use exploding o¤ers for clerkships which would be withdrawn if not
accepted in some very short time, sometimes during the telephone call itself.
The sociologist John Bone inltrated two direct selling organizations and documents
their sales tactics. Bone (2006, pages 7173) describes how a home improvement com-
pany o¤ers its potential customers a regular price for the agreed service, together with a
discounted price termed a rst call discount if the customer signs the contract imme-
diately. On page 89 he records how a kitchen installation company asks for a £ 50 deposit
to hold the priceif the consumer does not sign the contract immediately but wishes to
keep the option open.
Robinson (1995) discusses other examples of buy-now discounts, such as a prospective
tenant who is o¤ered an apartment for $900 per month but to whom the landlord o¤ers
$850 if she agrees immediately, or a car dealer trying to close a deal who o¤ers a further
1This tactic is echoed in David Mamets 1983 play, Glengarry Glen Ross, where the salesmen frequently
claim to be in the area only for that day. (Mamet once worked in a real estate o¢ ce in Chicago.)
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$500 o¤ the price if the buyer accepts now, so (as he claims) he can then make his sales
quota for that month. A recent report on the UK cosmetic surgery market was concerned
about reports of patients being o¤ered discounts for surgery if they sign a binding contract
at the end of the rst consultation.2
To implement these search deterrence strategies a seller needs to be able to recognize
customers, in the sense that it can distinguish potential customers it meets for the rst time
from those who have returned after a previous encounter. In most markets this is simply
not possible. (A supermarket, for instance, keeps no track of a consumers entry and exit
from the store.) Nevertheless, in many markets especially those that depend on personal
interaction between buyers and sellers customer recognition is feasible. A sales assistant
might discern from a potential customers questions or demeanor that this is her rst visit
to the store for the relevant product. A telephone or doorstep seller can be condent when
the rst encounter with a prospective customer occurs. Sometimes as with job o¤ers,
automobile sales, housing rentals, tailored consumer nancial products, medical or life
insurance, cosmetic surgery, or home improvements a consumer needs to interact with a
seller to discuss specic requirements, and this process reveals the consumers identity. In
online markets, a retailer using tracking software may be able to tell if a visitor using the
same computer has visited the site before.3
Plan of the paper. Our basic model is presented in section 2. There, we assume there is a
single seller attempting to sell to a rational customer who has an uncertain outside option
(which might be an alternative o¤er from a non-strategic rival) which she can discover
only after leaving the seller for the rst time.4 During her initial encounter with the
seller, the buyer discovers her idiosyncratic valuation for the sellers product and decides
between immediate purchase or investigation of the outside option. If her outside option
is disappointing the buyer may return to purchase from the seller, although at potentially
2See paragraph 5.8 of Review of the Regulation of Cosmetic Interventions (Final Report), Department
of Health (UK), April 2013.
3De los Santos (2008) presents an empirical study of search behaviour using data from online book
purchases, and nds that of those consumers who searched at least twice, approximately two-thirds buy
from the nal rm searched and one-third return to a rm searched earlier.
4There are many other methods to induce sales which rely on more psychological factors. Bone (page
90) describes the use of an extreme tactic: the sales woman burst into tearswhen the sale appeared to
be in di¢ culty, claiming she would be in trouble with her boss if she didnt make the sale.
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disadvantageous terms. In the benchmark setting of free recall (section 2.1), the seller
o¤ers the same price regardless of when the purchase is made. Using this basic model, we
go on to analyze the incentive to deter search, under the twin assumptions that the seller
can recognize customers and can commit to its selling mechanism.
In section 2.2 we discuss the protability of simple sales techniques exploding o¤ers,
buy-now discounts and deposits which are easy to communicate and rationalize to buy-
ers.5 Making it hard to buy the product later induces more consumers to buy immediately,
but it also restricts their ability to buy later after discovering an unfavorable outside op-
tion. We show that when the relevant demand curve is log-concave, it is protable to o¤er
a buy-now discount to a rst-time visitor or require her to pay a deposit if she wants to be
able to buy later. Making an exploding o¤er is protable in the more restrictive case where
demand is concave. In section 2.3 we derive the optimal way to sell in this environment.
This consists of allowing the buyer to buy immediately at a low price, to return later to buy
at a high price, together with a menu of deposit contracts. This optimal sales mechanism
involves search deterrence, in the sense that more buyers purchase without discovering the
outside option than would be the case with free recall.
In section 3, we extend this framework in two directions. In section 3.1 we discuss
the sellers equilibrium policy when it cannot commit to the price it o¤ers consumers
who wish to buy after search. In the basic model, the seller has two broad reasons to
discriminate against consumers who buy later: a strategic reason, to commit to make it
hard to buy later in order to discourage the investigation of rival o¤ers by its prospective
customers, and an informational reason, which reects the fact that the demand from
those consumers who buy after search is typically less elastic than the demand of those
who buy without search. When the seller cannot commit to its o¤ers to consumers who
buy later, the strategic motive cannot operate, but the informational motive remains. A
customer who returns to buy later reveals she has found no attractive alternative, and the
seller therefore often has an incentive to inict an unannounced price hike on this customer.
When buyers incur no intrinsic costs when returning to the seller after search, we show
5For example Bone (page 71) writes that to justify the companys rst call discountcustomers were
told the company had so many appointments that it was di¢ cult for our salespeople to cover them all
... if we went back to everyone twice we wouldnt see nearly as many people and would generate a lot less
business.
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that the seller may still o¤er a buy-now discount even if it cannot commit to its buy-later
price. When buyers incur intrinsic costs of returning, however, an argument similar to
Diamonds (1971) paradox shows that the only rational expectations equilibrium involves
no consumer returning to the seller after search, and the outcome is as if an exploding o¤er
is made.
Second, in section 3.2 we replace the exogenous outside option with a second strategic
seller. As in the monopoly analysis, for strategic or informational reasons either seller
has a unilateral incentive to engage in search deterrence. When both do this, however,
industry prots may fall relative to the free-recall regime. We study the case with linear
demand, where search deterrence not only leads to a less e¢ cient match between buyers
and products, but induces sellers to set higher prices. Market performance when these
sales techniques are employed is poor: sellers are usually worse o¤ relative to free recall,
and buyers obtain a less suitable product for a higher price.
Related literature. The basic mechanism in our model, that a higher cost of returning
to buy later makes agents less inclined to search, has been studied before. For instance,
Karni and Schwartz (1977) and Janssen and Parakhonyak (2012) show that an agent will
cease her search sooner than she would with free recall if returning to a previous option is
uncertain or costly. The uncertainty or cost of recall is exogenous in these papers, rather
than determined by a sellers choice of sales tactics.
Few previous papers relate directly to strategic search deterrence. One that does is
Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), who o¤er a model in which a seller deters search by making
onward search more costly, rather than by making it more costly to buy later. They suppose
that a consumers incremental search cost increases with her cumulative search e¤ort. If
a rm increases its in-store search cost (say, by making its tari¤ harder to comprehend),
this will make further search less attractive. They show that if the exogenous component
of search costs falls, rms unilaterally increase their endogenous element of search costs,
with the result that equilibrium prices are unchanged. Though otherwise very di¤erent,
our model and theirs both study how search frictions are determined endogenously: even
if intrinsic search frictions are negligible, a market may su¤er from substantial search
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frictions and high prices in equilibrium.6
In our model, a seller attempts to sell to a buyer before the buyer discovers her outside
option, i.e., before she knows her net valuation for the product. Other papers examine
similar issues in di¤erent settings. For instance, Lewis and Sappington (1994) discuss a
situation where a buyer has an idiosyncratic valuation for the sellers product, and the
seller can control how much the buyer knows about her valuation before purchase. One
selling strategy allows the buyer to discover her valuation before agreeing to buy, in which
case she purchases when the price is below the valuation. A second strategy, akin to an
exploding o¤er in our framework, forces the buyer to buy without knowing anything about
her valuation. The second strategy is more protable when the production cost is small. In
situations where the seller prefers to sell before consumers know their valuation, DeGraba
(1995) shows how it can do this by articially restricting supply: doing so can induce a
buying frenzy, where buyers buy early (before they know their value) so as to have a
better chance of obtaining the item.
Aghion and Bolton (1986) investigate an entry deterrence scenario in which one seller
considers selling to a buyer before a second seller enters the market. The two sellers o¤er
a homogenous product, and the production cost of the potential entrant is uncertain. If
the buyer waits for the entry decision to be made, she benets from a lower price in the
event that the entrant has a lower cost. In other words, the entrant provides an uncertain
outside option for the buyer. For the buyer to agree to buy early, she must be o¤ered a
price low enough to compensate her for foregoing this option. The authors show that the
incumbent has no incentive to induce the buyer to purchase early by means of a low price.7
However, it does have an incentive to o¤er a penalty contract: before the entry decision is
made the buyer agrees to buy from the incumbent at a specied price, but she is able to
renege and buy from the entrant provided she pays a specied penalty to the incumbent.
6The model presented in section 3 of Armstrong and Chen (2013) describes a scenario where a seller
attempts to deter search by revealing that its earlier price was high. The fact that a product with limited
stock remains available after being o¤ered for some time suggests to potential customers that few early
consumers were willing to buy, for the reason that they found a better-value option elsewhere. This makes
a consumer inclined to search elsewhere. However, this e¤ect is dampened when the earlier price was high.
7An attempt to secure early purchase with a low price is not an exploding o¤er in our sense, since if
the buyer rejects the initial o¤er, she has the ability to return to buy from the incumbent once the entry
decision is made.
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This penalty contract is similar to the deposit contracts discussed in this paper.8
Our paper (especially the analysis of optimal selling in section 2.3) is related to the
literature on sequential screening. An early contribution to the sequential screening liter-
ature which in some ways is close to our approach is Courty and Li (2000). They analyze
a model with a single seller, where a buyer initially has private information about the
distribution of her eventual valuation for the product (say, an air ticket), but only learns
her actual valuation when she needs to y. The airline can o¤er tickets for sale at the
time of ying when travellers know their valuations. Alternatively, akin to an exploding
o¤er, they might only sell advance tickets before buyers know their valuation. However,
the airline can do better than either policy by o¤ering a menu of refundcontracts, where
a more expensive ticket comes with a more generous refund if it turns out the buyer does
not need the ticket.
Our model di¤ers from Courty and Li (2000) in a number of ways. In the earlier paper,
the buyers information evolves exogenously over time, while in our model the buyer only
discovers her net valuation if she chooses to search.9 We analyze additional settings,
such as when the seller cannot commit to buy-later prices or when the outside option is
provided by a second strategic seller. We study the welfare e¤ects of sequential screening
tactics, which in our framework seem often to be negative, while Courty and Lis analysis
is concerned with the sellers perspective. Our focus is more on casual sales encounters,
where a salesman attempts to deter a buyer from investigating a rival seller, rather than
the publicly announced tari¤ policies of airlines. Because of this last point, we discuss ad
hoc but simple sales techniques alongside the optimal way to sell.
Finally, our analysis of search deterrence without commitment (section 3.1) relates to
the literature on durable good pricing initiated by Coase (1972). In Coases problem,
when a consumer does not buy quickly, she reveals she has a relatively low valuation for
8Diamond and Maskin (1979) study the impact of di¤erent types of penalty contracts in a two-sided
search market with uncertain match quality. In their model, two parties form a relationship rst and then
consider whether to search for better partners. Search deterrence happens in their model because the
compensation paid to the abandoned party makes search and breach less attractive.
9In this respect our analysis is closer to Krahmer and Strausz (2011). They consider a procurement
setting where the agent can choose to invest costly e¤ort to discover the actual cost of implementing a
project after signing the contract. As in our paper, they nd that the optimal mechanism features a xed
price and a menu of option contracts, and it not only aims to screen agents with di¤erent ex ante private
information but also takes into account the incentive for agents to acquire information.
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the product. Because of this adverse selection, the seller has an incentive to reduce its price
to consumers who buy later. In our model, by contrast, if a consumer tries to buy later,
she reveals that she searched and found her outside option was disappointing. Due to this
advantageous selection, our seller often wishes to set a higher price to these consumers.10
2 A Basic Model
This section studies a sellers incentive to deter consumer search in a setting with a single
seller and an uncertain outside option. The seller o¤ers a product with constant marginal
cost which we normalize to zero. The product yields random utility u  0 to a risk-neutral
buyer. This utility u is observed by the buyer when she rst encounters the seller, and is
unchanged over time, but is not observed by the seller. The distribution of u is continuous
with support [0; umax], and has distribution function F () and density function f() which
is continuous on its support. There is an outside option (e.g., an alternative o¤er from
a non-strategic competitor), which yields uncertain net surplus v  0 to the buyer. For
simplicity, v is assumed to be independently distributed from u.11 The distribution of v has
support [0; vmax], and has distribution function G() and has a continuous density function
g(v) on (0; vmax]. (We allow the distribution for v to have an atomat v = 0, reecting
the possibility that the buyer has no useful outside option.) The buyer does not know
the realization of v when she rst encounters the seller, and she needs to incur a search
cost s  0 and to leave the seller in order to reach the outside option and discover its
value. The seller never observes the realization of v. For simplicity, we assume for now
that the buyer incurs no further search costs if she comes back and buys from the seller
after investigating the outside option.12
10Zhu (2012) presents a related model which examines equilibrium pricing in a market for over-the-
counter nancial securities. His model has a single seller who searches sequentially for a high price o¤er
among a number of potential buyers. A buyers price is valid only for the initial contact, and if the seller
rejects the initial o¤er and contacts that buyer a second time, the buyer suggests a new price. Zhu shows
that a buyer lowers the o¤ered price if the seller makes a second approach, since the buyer infers the seller
did not nd an attractive price quote from other buyers.
11Correlation between u and v might induce a complex non-monotonic stopping rule for the buyer.
Uncertainty in v might be due to a rivals uncertain costs or capacities which induce an uncertain price,
or as in section 3.2 a rival might supply a di¤erentiated product with uncertain match utility.
12In most cases, consumers do face an intrinsic cost of returning to a previously visited rm. In most of
our analysis, introducing a small intrinsic returning cost does not a¤ect results qualitatively, but compli-
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If the consumer neither buys the rms product nor the outside option, her payo¤ is
zero. However, this is irrelevant if we assume that the search cost satises
s < v ; (1)
where v is the expected value of the outside option v. Condition (1) ensures that the
consumer prefers investigating the outside option to buying nothing. The buyer gains no
extra utility if she consumes both the product and the outside option, i.e., her gross utility
with both items is maxfu; vg.
Let Q(p)  1   F (p) denote the demand curve faced by the rm in the hypothetical
case when the outside option is zero (i.e., v  0). We make the following assumption:
logQ(p) is strictly concave when Q(p) > 0 : (2)
This assumption implies that a prot function of the form pQ(p + k) is single-peaked in
price p, and this optimal price strictly decreases with k. That is to say, if a buyer needs to
achieve net surplus k in order to buy the product, the rm optimally chooses a lower price
when this required surplus is higher.
2.1 The free-recall benchmark
In most markets, a sellers price does not depend (in the short term) on when the buyer
decides to purchase, so that the buyer has free recallof the sellers o¤er. In this section,
we analyze this uniform pricing benchmark.
Suppose the rm o¤ers price P to the buyer, regardless of when the buyer decides to
purchase. Given P , when will the buyer choose to search? If she discovers utility u at the
rm, her net surplus if she buys immediately is u   P , while her expected net surplus if
she investigates the outside option is Ev[maxfu   P; vg]   s. (Here, Ev[:] denotes taking
expectations with respect to v. If she investigates the outside option she incurs the search
cost s, but then has the ability to consume the better of the two options.)
Write S(x)  Ev[maxfv; xg]  x for the expected benet of search when the buyer has
cates the analysis, and we assume it away. However, when we discuss the situation without commitment
in section 3.1, whether or not there is an intrinsic return cost will make an important di¤erence.
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free recall of payo¤ x at the seller. This can also be written as
S(x)  Ev[maxfv; xg]  x =
Z vmax
x
(1 G(v))dv : (3)
In words, S(x) measures how much the buyer would be willing to pay to be able to search
when she has access to the sure payo¤ x from the seller. Note that S(x) = v   x if
x  0, and S() is decreasing and convex. Using this notation, with free recall the buyer
will buy the sellers product without search whenever u   P  Ev[maxfu   P; vg]   s =
u  P + S(u  P )  s, i.e., if u  P + S 1(s). For convenience in the following, write
a = S 1(s) :
(From (1), such an a exists, and it is unique and positive.) The parameter a, which depends
only on the distribution of the outside option and the cost of its discovery, represents the
net surplus the buyer needs to be o¤ered by the seller in order to forgo search. Thus, the
fraction of consumers who buy without search at price P is Q(P + a).
A useful observation is that
Ev[minfv; ag] = Ev[v  maxf0; v   ag] = v   S(a) = v   s : (4)
Note that if the outside option is so attractive relative to the sellers product that a > umax,
then the buyer chooses to search even if she has the highest possible valuation umax and
the seller charges the lowest possible price of zero. To rule out this uninteresting case, we
make the following assumption:
umax  a : (5)
If the buyer investigates the outside option, she will return to buy from the seller when
v < u  P , i.e., when the outside option turns out to be worse than the sellers o¤er. The
buyers purchase decision for the various realizations of (u; v) is summarized in Figure 1.
Given this pattern of consumption, the rms total demand when it sets price P is
qF (P ) = Ev[Q(P + minfv; ag)] : (6)
For given P this demand increases with s, and the seller is better o¤ in a market with
greater search frictions.
10
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P + S 1(s)0 P
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buy later
and pay P
consume outside option
buy immediately
and pay P
Figure 1: Demand with free recall
The sellers demand qF can be divided into two components: the buy-nowdemand
from those consumers who buy without search and which is equal toQ(P+a), and the buy-
laterdemand from those consumers who return to buy after search and which is equal
to the measure of the triangle on the gure. It is clear that Q(P + a)  qF (P )  Q(P ),
so that the rms total demand is greater than its buy-now demand but lower than its
hypothetical demand Q(P ) if consumers had no outside option. As is proved in the next
result, assumption (2) implies that the respective elasticities are inversely related to the
scale of demand, so that the sellers demand qF (P ) is more elastic than Q(P ) but less
elastic than Q(P + a). (Omitted proofs are found in the appendix.)
Lemma 1 Let PF > 0 be the optimal price in the free-recall regime. Then
(i) PF < pM , where pM maximizes pQ(p) and so is the monopoly price if there were no
outside option;
(ii) PF > p^, where p^ maximizes pQ(p + a) and so is the monopoly price if there were a
deterministic outside option a.
The observation that the sellers total demand is less elastic than its buy-now demand
implies that buy-later demand is less elastic than buy-now demand. In fact, buy-later
demand can increase with price in the free-recall regime: from Figure 1 an increase in P
shifts the region of buy-later demand uniformly to the right, and so this demand increases
with P whenever the density f(u) increases with u, i.e., when Q() is concave. The fact
that buy-later demand is less elastic than buy-now demand explains in part why the seller
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wishes to discriminate against those consumers who choose to buy later, as we will see in
the next sections.
If there were an intrinsic cost of returning to the seller after search, say r, one can adapt
the above discussion to calculate the sellers demand for a given free-recall price P . It is
possible that the sellers demand increases with r. Indeed, by making use of the Slutsky
symmetry of cross-price e¤ects, one can show that demand increases with r if and only if
buy-later demand increases with P . As observed above, a su¢ cient condition for this to
hold is that demand Q be concave, while if Q is convex a greater return cost will reduce
demand. When it is more costly to return to the seller after search, this induces more
consumers with relatively high u to buy without search, but reduces the number (with
relatively low u) who come back to buy later. When the density for u increases, i.e., when
Q is concave, the former e¤ect outweighs the latter.
2.2 Two simple ways to deter search
In this section we examine the protability of two simple selling procedures which act to
deter search.
Buy-now discounts. Consider rst the situation where the seller can engage in price
discrimination, and is able to charge the buyer di¤erent prices depending on whether she
buys immediately or later. Specically, suppose that the seller o¤ers two prices: a regular
(buy-later) price p which applies if the consumer decides to buy after investigating the
outside option, and a discounted buy-now price p   if she buys at the rst opportunity.
Thus, the buy-now discount is   0, and if  = 0 we return to the free-recall regime.
If the buyer values the product at u, she prefers to buy without search if u  (p  ) 
Ev[maxfu  p; vg]  s = u  p  s+S(u  p), i.e., if u  p+S 1(s+ ). If she does search,
she will return to buy later if u  p  v, and this pattern of demand is depicted in Figure
2.13 The gure depicts the situation with some buy-later demand, which is the case if the
13The buyer may have a third option when faced with a buy-now discount, which is to buy the product
immediately at the discounted rate and continue to search for the outside option. When the price of the
product is high (e.g., due to a high production cost), when the cost of carrying the product as the buyer
continues searching is high, or when buying both the product and the outside option is unrealistic (e.g., it
is rarely possible for someone to accept two distinct jobs simultaneously), this buy and searchoption is
not relevant. We have analyzed the model taking account of this buy and searchoption, and our main
results do not change qualitatively though the analysis can be much more involved. For clarity we do not
12
buy-now discount satises S 1(s+ ) > 0, i.e., if  + s < v.
For a given buy-later price p, by comparing Figures 1 and 2 we see that the impact of
introducing a buy-now discount  on total demand is precisely as if the exogenous search
cost increased from s to s+  in the free-recall regime. In particular, for a given buy-later
price introducing a buy-now discount will boost the rms demand. Thus, the rm is
able endogenously to increase search frictions via  , but at the revenue cost of o¤ering a
buy-now discount to its buyers.
-
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p+ S 1(s+ )0 p
u
v
buy later
and pay p
consume outside option
buy immediately
and pay p  
Figure 2: Demand with a buy-now discount
As with (6), the sellers total demand with buy-later price p and buy-now discount  is
qBN(p; ) = Ev[Q(p+ minfv; S 1(s+ )g)] : (7)
Since
d
dx
S 1(x) =   1
1 G(S 1(x)) ;
it follows that
@
@
qBN(p; ) =  Q0(p+ S 1(s+ )) > 0
and
@
@
qBN(p; )

=0
=  Q0(p+ a) : (8)
consider this option further. In addition, in the deposit regime and the optimal mechanism discussed later,
or in the regime with a smallbuy-now discount, this third buy and searchstrategy is never optimal
for a buyer.
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Since buy-now demand receives discount  , the sellers prot is
BN(p; ) = pqBN(p; )  Q(p+ S 1(s+ )) ;
and from (8) we see that
@
@
BN(p; )

=0
=  pQ0(p+ a) Q(p+ a) : (9)
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that this expression is strictly positive when p = PF , the most
protable free-recall price.14 In sum, we deduce:
Proposition 1 O¤ering a buy-now discount is more protable than allowing free recall.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that, for a given buy-later price, the demand expansion
e¤ect of o¤ering a buy-now discount outweighs the revenue loss from the discount given
to those consumers who buy without search. Equivalently, any demand reduction caused
by imposed a buy-later premium is outweighed by the revenue gain from charging the
premium to those consumers who buy later. In some cases, charging a buy-later premium
actually boosts the sellers demand. For a given buy-now price P , introducing a buy-later
premium  causes a buyer to face a cost of returning to the seller, and as discussed in
section 2.1, this boosts or reduces total demand according to whether the demand curve
Q is concave or convex.
This can be seen most transparently if we compare demand with free recall to demand
with an exploding o¤er (which is the limit of the situation with a large buy-later premium).
Suppose the seller makes an exploding o¤er, i.e., it forces the buyer to decide whether to
buy its product before she is able to discover the outside option. If the sellers price is P
and the buyer values the sellers product at u, then her net surplus will be u   P if she
buys the product. If she does not buy the product but chooses to investigate the outside
option, her expected net surplus will be v   s. Therefore, the buyer will buy the product
immediately if and only if u  P + v   s, and the sellers demand with an exploding o¤er
at price P is
qE(P ) = Q(P + v   s) : (10)
14This argument has assumed that there is buy-now demand in the free-recall regime. If there is no
buy-now demand in the free-recall regime (for instance, if s = 0), under condition (5) a modied argument
shows that the seller has an incentive to introduce a buy-now discount such that there is positive buy-now
demand.
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If Q() is convex, Jensens Inequality implies that
qF (P ) = Ev[Q(P + minfv; ag)]  Q(P + Ev[minfv; ag]) = Q(P + v   s) = qE(P ) ;
where the second equality follows from (4). Therefore, when Q is convex making an
exploding o¤er can only reduce the sellers demand. The reverse argument can be made
when Q is concave, provided we take care that demand is always positive. (The function
Q() cannot be globally concave since it is either zero for large p if umax is nite, or
it approaches zero asymptotically.) Specically, suppose that at the free-recall price PF
there is positive buy-now demand, i.e., Q(PF + a) > 0. Then the sellers demand Q(PF +
minfv; ag) is positive for all v. A parallel argument implies that making an exploding o¤er
at the free-recall price PF will boost the sellers demand and prots when Q() is concave
(whenever Q is positive).
This discussion is summarized in the following result:
Proposition 2
(i) If Q() is convex, allowing free recall is (weakly) more protable than making an explod-
ing o¤er;
(ii) If Q() is concave whenever Q > 0 and there is positive buy-now demand with free
recall, making an exploding o¤er is (weakly) more protable than allowing free recall.
To illustrate the analysis so far, consider an example where both u and v are uniformly
distributed on [0; 1] and the search cost is s = 1
18
. It follows that Q(P ) = 1   P and
S 1(x) = 1   p2x (for 0  x  1
2
). Figure 1 implies that free-recall demand at price P
is qF (P ) = 59   P . The optimal free-recall price is therefore 518 , which also equals total
demand. Of this demand, a fraction 20% comes from consumers who buy without search
and the remaining 80% consists of those consumers who search and then return to buy.
The sellers prot with free recall is ( 5
18
)2  0:077 while aggregate consumer surplus can
be calculated to be about 0.511.
Suppose instead that the seller o¤ers a buy-now discount scheme, where P is its price
for immediate purchase and P + is its price for purchase after search. As discussed above,
since Q() is linear, a buy-later premium does not a¤ect the sellers total demand, which
15
is therefore just equal to qF = 59   P . The sellers prot is therefore
BN = P
 
5
9
  P+ (  buy-later demand) :
Buy-later demand is the area of the triangle in Figure 2, which is 1
2
(S 1(s+))2. Thus, the
sellers prot is additively separable in its buy-now price P and its buy-later premium  . As
such, the optimal buy-now price is again P = 5
18
, while the optimal buy-later premium can
be calculated to be   0:121, which is about 43% of the buy-now price. Note that when
the seller engages in this form of price discrimination, in this example both its prices weakly
increase, which contrasts with the usual case in monopoly third-degree price discrimination
where the optimal uniform price typically lies between the discriminatory prices. In this
regime, about 70% of the sellers customers buy without search while only 30% buy later,
which is approximately the opposite pattern to that with free recall and so this sales tactic
signicantly deters search. Consumers in this regime are worse o¤ relative to free recall
since the price for buying later rises and the buy-now price is unchanged. The sellers
prot with a buy-now discount is about 13% higher than it would be with free recall, while
consumer surplus is 2% lower.
Finally, suppose the seller makes an exploding o¤er at price P . A type-u buyer will buy
if and only if u P  v  s = 4
9
. Therefore, the sellers demand with an exploding o¤er at
price P is exactly the same as with free recall, and so the optimal price with an exploding
o¤er is also P = 5
18
and the seller makes the same prot using the two sales techniques.
However, now all of the consumers who buy do so immediately. Consumers are now about
6% worse o¤ relative to free recall.
Deposit requirements. A second way to deter search is to require the buyer to pay
a non-refundable deposit if she wishes to be able to buy later. Specically, suppose the
seller o¤ers two options: a buyer can buy immediately at price P , or in return for paying
a deposit D  P she can buy later at the incremental price P  D. (More general deposit
contracts are analyzed in the next section.) If the buyer does not pay the deposit, the
seller does not serve her if she returns later. With this selling scheme, if the buyer buys the
item, she pays P regardless of when she does so; but if she retains the right to buy later
but ends up nding a superior outside option, she still pays the seller D. Thus in contrast
to the buy-now discount setting, where the seller penalizes the buyer who chooses to buy
16
later, here the seller penalizes some buyers who choose not to buy later. An exploding o¤er
is a special case of this procedure when D = P , while free recall corresponds to D = 0.15
Faced with this sales procedure, a buyer has three options. If she buys immediately,
the type-u buyers surplus is u P . If she chooses the deposit contract, and hence goes on
to search, her expected surplus is
Ev[maxfu  p; vg]  s D = u  P   s+ S(u  p) ; (11)
where we have written p = P   D for the buy-laterprice in this selling scheme. The
buyer prefers the rst strategy to the second whenever u  p + a. Finally, the buyer can
also choose not to pay the deposit, in which case she gives up the sellers product and her
expected surplus is v   s.
In a similar manner to the function S() in (3), dene R(x)  Ev[maxfv; xg   v] to be
the consumers expected benet from being able to return to obtain surplus x from the
seller after search rather than consuming the outside option for sure. This can be written
alternatively as
R(x)  Ev[maxfv; xg   v] = S(x) + x  v =
Z x
0
G(v)dv : (12)
In words, R(x) measures how much the consumer who searches would be willing to pay for
the ability to return to obtain surplus x from the seller after search. Clearly, R(x) = 0 if
x  0, and R is convex and increasing. Using this notation, the surplus from paying the
deposit in (11) is
R(u  p) D + v   s ; (13)
and so the buyer is indi¤erent between paying the deposit and abandoning the seller alto-
gether if R(u  p) = D. Therefore, the consumer prefers paying the deposit to leaving the
rm irrevocably if u  p+R 1(D).
On the assumption that the deposit is small enough that R 1(D)  a = S 1(s), the
pattern of demand is as shown on Figure 3. Note that setting D = 0 implies that consumer
behaviour is as in the free-recall regime shown in Figure 1.
15Note also that a deposit requirement is equivalent to the refund contract analyzed by Courty and Li
(2000), since it is as if the buyer can purchase the item for price P on her rst visit (but not subsequently),
and she has the right to return it (say, if she discovers a superior outside option) for a refund equal to
P  D.
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Figure 3: Demand with a deposit contract
Keeping the total price xed at P , we see that a buyer is more likely to buy immediately
with a deposit D > 0 (i.e., with a smaller buy-later price p) than with free recall, and so
requiring a deposit acts to deter search.
We argue that the seller can boost prots relative to free recall by requiring a positive
deposit to secure the product. Write qD(p;D) for the sellers total demand in terms of the
deposit D and buy-later price p. From Figure 3 the sellers prot is
D(p;D) = pqD(p;D) +DQ(p+R
 1(D)) :
When D > 0 it follows from (12) that
d
dD
R 1(D) =
1
R0(R 1(D))
=
1
G(R 1(D))
:
Using this, one sees from Figure 3 that
@
@D
qD(p;D) = Q
0(p+R 1(D)) ;
and so taking the limit as D ! 0 we have
@
@D
qD(p;D)

D=0
= Q0(p) :
Moreover,
@
@D
DQ(p+R 1(D))

D=0
= lim
D!0
DQ(p+R 1(D))
D
= lim
D!0
Q(p+R 1(D)) = Q(p) :
18
Putting these two e¤ects together implies that
@
@D
D(p;D)

D=0
= pQ0(p) +Q(p) :
Part (i) of Lemma 1 shows that the optimal free recall price PF is below the monopoly
price pM , and so the above expression is positive when p = PF . We deduce that starting
from the most-protable free recall price, the seller can boost prots by requiring a positive
deposit if the consumer wishes to return to buy later. In sum:
Proposition 3 Requiring potential customers to pay a deposit if they wish to be able to
return to buy later is strictly more protable than allowing free recall.
For a given price P , introducing a deposit requirement D will boost or contract the
sellers total demand according to whether Q is concave or convex. In particular, if Q
is linear then requiring a deposit leaves the sellers demand unchanged, and so clearly
raises prot since some people then pay D while with free recall they paid nothing. In
the same example where u and v are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and s = 1
18
, we have
R 1(x) =
p
2x and total demand with price P and deposit D is again qF = 59   P . The
sellers prot is therefore
D = P
 
5
9
  P+ (D  [fraction who pay deposit but do not buy])
The fraction who pay the deposit but do not end up buying is 1
2
(2
3
 p2D)(4
3
 p2D). The
optimal total price is therefore again P = 5
18
, and the optimal deposit can be calculated
to be D  0:083, which is about 30% of the price. Here, about half of those who buy
the product do so without search, while the other half pay the deposit and buy later. In
this example, although not in general, this sales strategy yields precisely the same prot
as the buy-now discount regime. However, consumers fare less well in the deposit regime,
and their loss is about twice as great relative to free recall as was the case in the buy-now
discount regime.
In this section we have discussed two natural, but perhaps ad hoc, selling procedures
and found mild conditions which ensure they generate higher prots than free recall. These
procedures are easy to communicate and rationalize to buyers, and so merit analysis in
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their own right. However, while it was straightforward to demonstrate the sellers incentive
to depart from uniform pricing, the ad hoc nature of these procedures makes it hard to
obtain attractive results about the most protable version of either tactic. For instance, it
is unclear whether in general the optimal buy-now discount tari¤ induces a greater fraction
of consumers to buy without search than would be the case with free recall. In the next
section we derive the optimal selling mechanism for the seller. As well as being a useful
benchmark with which to compare prots in the ad hoc schemes, the description of the
optimal way to sell is relatively transparent in terms of the primitives of the model.16
2.3 The optimal way to sell
In this section we derive the sellers optimal selling procedure. As will be seen, the optimal
mechanism incorporates both buy-now discounts and deposit contracts. Specically, a
consumer has the option either to buy the product immediately at a relatively low price,
P , or return to buy later at a relatively high price (in fact, at the monopoly price pM which
maximizes pQ(p)). In addition to this pair of options, a consumer is able to choose from a
menu of deposit contracts, whereby by paying a deposit on her rst visit she obtains the
right to return to buy later at a specied price. Faced with these options, a consumer with
high u will choose to buy immediately without search, a consumer with low u will not pay
a deposit and not purchase the item, while a consumer with an intermediate u will search
but pay a deposit for the right to return later if the outside option is poor.
In the following discussion we derive the sellers optimal choice of procedure within a
restricted class of mechanisms, namely a buy-now price together with a menu of deposit
contracts. In the appendix, we demonstrate that this selling mechanism is the most prof-
itable among all feasible mechanisms by using the Revelation Principle. (For instance, the
seller might ask the buyer to report the realization of the outside option after search, or the
seller might commit to sell the product only with some specied probability if the buyer
returns later.) In more detail, suppose the seller o¤ers its product for immediate sale at
16Another advantage of analyzing these simple selling strategies is that our results about their use will
often be robust to natural extensions of the basic framework. For instance, if the search cost s varied
across consumers (and was uncorrelated with u and v), our results about the incentive to o¤er a buy-now
discount or to require a deposit remain valid. However, it would not be possible to derive the optimal
selling mechanism in this extension, as buyers have two-dimensional private information about s and u.
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price P , and also allows the buyer to choose from a menu of deposit contracts of the form
whereby to be able to buy later at price p the buyer must pay deposit D(p). If the buyer
chooses none of these options, the seller commits not to serve her if she tries to return to
buy later. (In the optimal scheme, though, we will see that one of the deposit contracts
involves D = 0, and a buyer is free to return to buy later at the monopoly price pM .)
A buyer with match utility u, buy-later price p and deposit D obtains expected surplus
from search equal to (13). Given the sellers menu of buy-later options fp;D(p)g, if the
buyer decides to pay a deposit she will choose the best contract from the deposit menu,
and her resulting surplus is
(u)  max
p
: fR(u  p) D(p) + v   sg :
Since the function R() is increasing and convex, () is also increasing and convex and
hence di¤erentiable almost everywhere. Let p(u) be the optimal choice of buy-later price
for the type-u buyer (which is uniquely determined almost everywhere). Since R() is
convex, a simple revealed preference argument shows p(u) must weakly decrease with u.
The reason that a buyer with a higher u will choose a contract specifying a lower buy-later
price is because she anticipates she is more likely to buy later, and hence she has more at
stake in securing a low buy-later price. The envelope theorem implies that
0(u) = R0(u  p(u)) = G(u  p(u)) ; (14)
and the deposit payment associated with the buy-later price p(u) is
D(p(u)) = R(u  p(u)) + v   s  (u) : (15)
Expression (14) implies that the surplus from choosing a deposit contract is increasing
with u but with slope less than 1. By contrast, the surplus from leaving the rm altogether,
v   s, does not depend on u, and the surplus from immediate purchase, u   P , increases
with slope 1. Thus, we expect that for small u, say for u < u, the consumer leaves the
seller immediately, for intermediate u, say u  u  u^, the consumer chooses one of the
deposit contracts, and for u > u^ the consumer buys immediately without search.17 For the
17By choosing u and u^ appropriately one can allow only a subset of the three strategies to be made
available. For instance, setting u = u^ means that no option to buy later is made available and the seller
makes an exploding o¤er.
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buyer to be indi¤erent between the relevant options at the points u and u^, we require
(u) = v   s ; (u^) = u^  P : (16)
If the type-u buyer chooses a deposit contract with buy-later price p, she will return
to buy later when v  u  p, i.e., with probability G(u  p). Therefore, the sellers prot
from this scheme is
 = P (1  F (u^)) +
Z u^
u
fD(p(u)) + p(u)G(u  p(u))g dF (u)
= P (1  F (u^)) +
Z u^
u
fR(u  p(u)) + v   s  (u) + p(u)G(u  p(u))g dF (u) ;
where the second equality follows from (15). Integrating by parts and using (14) yieldsZ u^
u
(u)dF (u) = (u)(1  F (u))  (u^)(1  F (u^)) +
Z u^
u
G(u  p(u))(1  F (u))du :
Substituting this into the expression for prot, and using (16), we see that the sellers
prot is
(u^ (v s))(1 F (u^))+
Z u^
u

R(u  p(u)) +

p(u)  1  F (u)
f(u)

G(u  p(u))

dF (u) : (17)
We need to choose p() to maximize the integrand fg in (17). Note rst that setting
p(u)  u implies that the integrand fg is equal to zero. Dene
(u)  u  1  F (u)
f(u)
(18)
for the agents virtual surplus, which is strictly increasing given assumption (2). Consider
rst the case where u is small enough that (u)  0. (Since the monopoly price pM which
maximizes pQ(p) satises (pM) = 0, this is the situation where u  pM .) Then one can
check that the integrand is increasing in p for p < u, and at (and equal to zero) for
p  0. Thus, the integrand fg is maximized by choosing any p  u and it equals zero.
Second, consider the case where (u) > 0 (i.e., u > pM). In this case, the integrand fg is
single-peaked in p, and reaches its maximum R((u)) > 0 at p(u) = 1 F (u)
f(u)
. This pair of
observations also implies that prot strictly decreases with u when u > pM , and does not
22
depend on u when u  pM . Thus, it is optimal to choose any u  pM , and for simplicity
we choose u = pM .18
Substituting p(u) = 1 F (u)
f(u)
and u = pM into the prot expression (17) yields
 = (u^  (v   s))(1  F (u^)) +
Z u^
pM
R((u))dF (u) : (19)
Using the fact from (12) that R(x) = S(x) + x   v, one can check that the derivative
of (19) with respect to the upper threshold u^ is f(u^)[S((u^))   s]. Therefore, prot is
single-peaked in u^ and maximized when (u^) = S 1(s) = a. Note that the price p^ which
maximizes pQ(p+a) satises (a+ p^) = a, and so u^ = a+ p^. Since  is a strictly increasing
function, it follows that u^ > pM . In addition, condition (5) and the fact (umax) = umax
imply that u^  umax, so that there is some buy-now demand at the optimum.
Since (14) implies that 0(u) = G((u)) for pM  u  u^, it follows that in this range
the buyers surplus is given by
(u) = v   s+
Z u
pM
G((~u))d~u (20)
and so (15) implies that the deposit associated with buy-later price p(u) is as reported in
(21) below. Setting u = u^ in (20) and using (16) implies that the buy-now price P is as
given in (23) below. Since R() is a convex function and the optimal buy-later price p(u)
is decreasing in u, standard arguments show that when the deposit schedule D is given by
(21) and the buy-now price P is given by (23), a buyer will choose the correct contract.
Therefore, in the optimal selling mechanism, a buyer with u  u^ buys the product
immediately, a buyer with intermediate u 2 (pM ; u^) pays a deposit D(u), investigates the
outside option and returns to buy later if v  (u), while a buyer with u  pM consumes
the outside option. This pattern of demand is illustrated in Figure 4. To summarize,
the optimal procedure within the restricted class of mechanisms consisting of a buy-now
price together with a menu of deposit contracts is as described in the following result.
We show further in the appendix that this procedure is also optimal within the general
class of incentive-compatible selling mechanisms.
18The reason there is some indeterminacy in u is because there is no di¤erence for the seller or buyer
between (i) the type-u buyer choosing not to participate and (ii) the type-u buyer participating but
choosing a deposit contract with buy-later price p(u) = u and deposit D(u) = 0. Of course, in (ii) the
buyer buys nothing and pays nothing, but formally the buyer participatesin the sellers scheme.
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Figure 4: Demand in the optimal mechanism
Proposition 4 Let () be given in (18), and let pM satisfy (pM) = 0 and u^ satisfy
(u^) = a. The optimal selling procedure is given by:
(i) if u  pM the type-u buyer consumes the outside option for sure;
(ii) if pM  u < u^, the type-u buyer pays the seller a deposit
D(u) = R((u)) 
Z u
pM
G((~u))d~u ; (21)
investigates the outside option, and returns to buy the sellers product later if v < (u) at
the incremental price
p(u) = u  (u) ; (22)
(iii) if u  u^, the type-u buyer consumes the sellers product without search at price
P = D(u^) + u^  a : (23)
In this optimal scheme, in the intermediate range where the buyer pays a deposit we
see that D(u) increases with u while p(u) decreases with u. In particular, when u = pM ,
D(u) = 0, i.e., a buyer has the right to return to buy at the monopoly price, pM , without
paying a deposit. One can also check that the total charge p(u) + D(u) decreases with u
in this range, and p(u^) + D(u^) = P . This implies that the buy-now price P is below the
total charge p(u) + D(u) if the buyer searches and returns to buy later. This last point
implies that the seller deters search, in the sense that the consumer buys immediately
more often than she would in a free-recall regime. In the free-recall regime, the buyer buys
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immediately when u  a+PF , where PF is the equilibrium free-recall price. In this optimal
scheme, the buyer buys immediately when u  u^ = a + p^, where p^ maximizes pQ(p + a).
However, Lemma 1 shows that PF > p^ , and so the seller does indeed encourage immediate
purchase in this optimal mechanism. In sum:
Corollary 1 In the optimal selling mechanism: (i) it is cheaper for the consumer to buy
immediately than to buy after search (i.e., P < p(u) +D(u)), and (ii) more consumers buy
without search than would be the case with free recall.
Returning to our example where u and v were uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and s = 1
18
,
one can check that the buy-now threshold in the optimal mechanism is u^ = 5
6
. From (23)
the buy-now price is P = 5
18
and total output is also 5
18
, just as with all the earlier ad hoc
schemes. Of the consumers who buy from the seller, exactly 60% do so without searching.
From (19), the sellers prot from the optimal mechanism is about 0.09. This is 16% greater
than the prots with free recall, but only 3% more than the prots generated with either
of the simple schemes with buy-now discounts or deposits. Aggregate consumer surplus
here is similar to that with the simple deposit scheme, about 4% below that obtained with
free recall. Although total output is identical in all ve regimes that is, in free recall,
buy-now discounts, exploding o¤ers, deposits and the optimal mechanism the pattern of
consumption in (u; v)-space is di¤erent in each case. Since the buy-now price is the same
in all regimes, in this example consumers are best o¤ with free recall (as that regime has
least restrictive buy-later policy) and worst o¤ with an exploding o¤er (as that entirely
removes the ability to buy later).
3 Extensions
3.1 Search deterrence without commitment
In the basic model we assumed that the seller can commit to its buy-later policy at the
time of the buyers initial visit. We discuss in this section what happens if we relax this
assumption. Suppose that the seller sets a price when the buyer rst visits and then sets
a second price if the buyer returns to try to buy after discovering the outside option. We
assume the seller can make no commitment about the buy-later price when the buyer rst
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visits, and the actual buy-later price can be discovered only after she returns to the seller.
We assume that buyers are rational, and foresee the sellers equilibrium price if they return
later.19 (At the end of this section we also discuss how lack of commitment a¤ects the
sellers ability to use other selling methods such as deposit contracts.)
Here, unlike the rest of the paper, it makes a crucial di¤erence whether or not the buyer
faces an intrinsic returning cost when she goes back to a previously-visited option (either
the seller, or the outside option). We consider the two cases in turn.
No intrinsic cost of return: Let P denote the buy-now price and p the buy-later price.
Given that a buyer incurs no further search frictions once she has discovered the outside
option, we suppose that once she has left the seller to search, she then discovers both her
outside option v and the sellers actual buy-later price p. However, the buyers decision
to search can depend only on the anticipated buy-later price, say pe, not the actual buy-
later price, and the sellers choice of buy-later price maximizes its prot given the pool of
consumers who search in equilibrium.
A detailed analysis of this problem would be complex, and for simplicity we focus on
the previous example where u and v are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and the search
cost is s = 1
18
.20 The procedure used to solve the sellers problem without commitment is
essentially the same as that used to solve a two-period version of Coases (1972) dynamic
pricing problem, and the details of the calculation are presented in the appendix. In this
example, the sellers most protable strategy is to o¤er the buy-now price P  0:251,
which induces the subgame-perfect buy-later price p  0:286. A substantial (14%) buy-
later premium is implemented, therefore, even though the seller cannot commit to its
buy-later price.
19It is plausible, especially in settings where there is face-to-face interaction between a savvy seller and
an inexperienced buyer, that a proportion of buyers are gullible rather than rational, and believe the
sellers claims. In this case, it is likely that the seller can a¤ect the propensity to buy by making claims
which are not credible. To illustrate, consider the situation where the seller claims that the buyer must
decide immediately whether or not to buy, whereas in fact any buyer who did return later would be o¤ered
the product on the same terms. If a fraction of buyers believed that they could not return later, the claim
makes these buyers more likely to buy immediately than if the claim was not made. Then by the same
argument as used for Proposition 2, falsely claiming that the o¤er is exploding will often be protable for
the seller when Q() is concave.
20One reason for the di¢ culty is that the required analysis is non-local, and we cannot examine local
departures from the free-recall regime in the way that is done elsewhere in the paper.
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The sellers prot from following this strategy is higher than its free-recall prots,
obtained when it could commit to sell at a uniform price to consumers. Note that P is
lower, and p is higher, than the most protable uniform price of 5
18
 0:278 with free recall.
Another relevant benchmark is to the optimal buy-now discount tari¤ with commitment,
as analyzed in section 2.2. There, we showed the optimal prices are P  0:278 and
p  0:399 in this example, which are both higher than the corresponding prices without
commitment.21 Thus, there is some similarity to Coasian price dynamics, where a sellers
inability to commit to its future prices implies all prices fall relative to the commitment
case. However, there is also an important di¤erence, in that in our setting the sellers
price rises if a buyer does not buy immediately, whereas in Coases setting prices are
lower for those consumers who buy later. In Coases setting, consumers who wish to buy
later have lower valuations than those who buy early, and this adverse selection induces
the seller to reduce its price. In our setting there are two e¤ects at play. First, the fact
that a consumer defers purchase implies (like Coase) that her valuation is not too high,
for otherwise she would have purchased immediately. The second e¤ect, however, goes
in the opposite direction: a consumer who wishes to buy later reveals that her outside
option is poor. Thus, there is a mixture of adverse and advantageous selection in the
pool of consumers who buy later. In the specic example presented here, the second e¤ect
outweighs the former, and the price is higher for later purchase.22
Positive intrinsic cost of return: Here we consider the situation in which there is a
positive return cost, so that a buyer incurs an exogenous cost r > 0 to return to the seller
after search. The analysis of this case is simpler and more general than the previous case
with r = 0, and we need make no assumptions about the distribution of u and v. (In fact,
we need not assume that Q is logconcave, nor that u and v are independently distributed.)
The main observation is that with an intrinsic returning cost r > 0, no matter how
21Consumer surplus here is higher than in any of the commitment regimes considered in section 2, very
slightly above that obtained with free recall.
22In examples with a higher search cost, more consumers buy immediately and those who search have
lower valuations for the sellers product. This induces the seller to set a lower buy-later price, and the
buy-later price p might be below the buy-now price P . In such cases, it seems plausible, though not
inevitable, that the buyer could pretend to search (without incurring the cost s) merely by stepping out
of the sellers door and back in again. Whether this form of consumer arbitrage is possible will a¤ect the
equilibrium outcome.
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small, there is no equilibrium with positive buy-later demand. Suppose, in contrast, that
such an equilibrium exists. Consider a buyer who does not accept the initial price but
returns to try to buy from the seller after investigating the outside option. By revealed
preference, such a buyer must have taste parameters (u; v) and have anticipated a buy-later
price pe and such that
u  pe   r > v : (24)
(Note that the buyer must incur the extra cost r to return to the seller.) Suppose the seller
actually sets a slightly higher buy-later price, say pe + ". The buyer, though surprised by
this unanticipated o¤er, is willing to accept it if " < r. In essence, the sellers buy-later
demand is perfectly inelastic around the anticipated price pe. Therefore, the seller has an
incentive to raise its buy-later price above pe, which contradicts the buyers belief, and
there can be no equilibrium in which the buyer returns to buy later if she does not accept
the initial price. This argument is analogous to the hold-up problem in Diamonds (1971)
paradox, where a small search cost causes a market to shut down.
As a result, any equilibrium, if one exists, involves a consumer either buying immedi-
ately at the initial price, or searching but never returning. This is because the only rational
belief buyers can hold is that the sellers buy-later price is so high that a costly return visit
is not worthwhile. Hence, the only equilibrium outcome in this setting is as if the seller is
forced to make an exploding o¤er.23 The seller will choose its initial price to maximize its
prot, given that no buyer will ever return.
We summarize the above discussion in the following:
Proposition 5 Suppose a buyer incurs a positive cost of returning to the seller after dis-
covering her outside option. Suppose the seller sets an initial price on a buyers rst visit,
but is unable to make any commitment about the price it will o¤er if the buyer decides to
search and return later. Then the unique equilibrium outcome is as if the seller must make
an exploding o¤er.
23To ensure that an exploding o¤er is an equilibrium, we need to specify what the seller believes o¤ the
equilibrium path when a buyer does return to buy later. If the seller believes that such a consumer has
taste parameters u = umax and v = 0, it would charge p = umax. Anticipating this, no consumer would
ever incur the cost r to return to the seller.
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When the seller could commit to its sales strategy, the extreme tactic of making an
exploding o¤er was never optimal. (For instance, it is always dominated by the more exible
buy-now discount scheme). Thus, Proposition 5 implies that the inability to commit at
all to future interactions with a potential buyer actually amplies the sellers incentive to
discriminate against those buyers who wish to buy later. The fact that a buyer chooses to
return to buy after search implies that she values the sellers product, net of her anticipated
buy-later price, above her outside option, and this gives the seller an incentive to raise its
price above the anticipated price on the buyers return.
Of course, in practice sellers can usually nd ways to commit, at least partially, to
future prices if the buyer returns later. For example, suppose the seller is able to commit
to any upper bound on its buy-later price when a buyer rst visits. (In a store, this upper
bound might be price label on the product, and a sales assistant has no authority to raise
the price above this displayed price.) Then, using the same argument as for Proposition 5,
the only equilibrium outcome is for the seller charge a buy-later price equal to this upper
bound if the buyer does not accept its initial o¤er. If the seller can commit to an upper
bound on its buy-later price, the buy-now discount regime analyzed in section 2.2 can
therefore be implemented.
Likewise, if the buyer pays a deposit the seller may be legally obliged to sell to the
buyer later at the specied price. Suppose, though, that a buyer did not pay the required
deposit on her rst visit, so that the seller has made no commitment to the price she will
be o¤ered if she attempts to buy later. By the same argument as in Proposition 5, the only
equilibrium is that the sellers price for this returning buyer is so disadvantageous that it
is not worthwhile for the buyer to return. Thus, the deposit regime studied in section 2.2
and the optimal mechanism studied in section 2.3 remain credible even if the seller cannot
commit to not to serve a buyer who did not pay the deposit for the right to buy later.
3.2 Search deterrence in duopoly
In the basic model in section 2, the buyers outside option was exogenously given. This
simple setting allowed us to investigate when a seller has an incentive to deter consumer
search in various ways, and the simplicity of the framework also enabled us to calculate
the optimal way to sell. However, the most natural interpretation of the outside option
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is that it is an o¤er made by a rival seller. As such, it is worthwhile to see how the
previous analysis extends to an oligopoly market with several strategic competitors, each
of which considers the use of search deterring strategies. As we will see, rms may end up
in a Prisoners Dilemma: as with monopoly, each seller has a unilateral incentive to deter
search, but when all sellers do this industry prots may fall. This extension also allows us
to consider the welfare e¤ects of these sales tactics. (In the monopoly model, we could not
calculate welfare when the buyer consumes the outside option, as the prot of the supplier
of the outside option was not specied.)
Suppose there are two sellers, 1 and 2, which are ex ante symmetric, and a consumers
gross valuation of each sellers product is an independent random draw from a common
distribution with distribution function F (u). As before, let Q(p)  1  F (p) and suppose
that (2) holds. We consider a game where rms rst choose their selling procedures and
prices, and then consumers search sequentially. A buyer discovers her initial sellers match
utility, initial price and buy-laterpolicy for free, but needs to incur the search cost s to
travel to the second seller and discover that sellers match utility and sales policy. Unless
stated otherwise, we assume there is no intrinsic cost to return to a previously visited seller
and that a seller can commit to its selling policy.
We analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this market. Consumers do not observe
a rms actual choice of price and sales policy before they start searching, but hold rational
expectations of rmsstrategies.24 Information unfolds as the search process goes on, but
consumersbeliefs about the o¤er made by the unsampled rm is unchanged, even if they
observe o¤-equilibrium o¤ers from the rst rm. We focus on symmetric pure-strategy
equilibria in which rms choose the same selling strategy and consumers visit them in a
random order (with half the consumers meeting seller 1 rst, and the remainder meeting
seller 2 rst).
This duopoly model has two main di¤erences with the monopoly setting with an exoge-
nous outside option. First, a seller here has buyers who meet it rst and buyers who have
rst encountered the rival and so already know their outside option. Second, although
24In a competitive environment sellers have no incentive to announce publicly that they engage in search
deterrence, and so it is natural to suppose that the choice of sales technique is discovered only when a
consumer visits a seller.
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we can regard a buyers surplus from the second seller as the outside option when she
is visiting the rst seller, this outside option now depends on the rivals price and so is
endogenous. However, as we will argue below these di¤erences do not substantially change
a sellers unilateral incentive to adopt these sales techniques.
Free-recall benchmark. If both rms allow free recall, the situation is a duopoly version
of Wolinsky (1986). Similarly to the function S() in the monopoly setting, dene
V (p)  Eu[maxf0; u  pg] =
Z umax
p
Q(u)du ; (25)
so that V (p)  s is the expected net benet of incurring search cost s to visit a monopolist
who charges p for its product. Similarly to (1), we assume that
V (pM) > s ; (26)
where, as before, pM is the monopoly price which maximizes pQ(p). Condition (26) implies
that a buyer is willing to incur the search cost s to visit a seller charging the monopoly
price. In the uniform case with Q(p) = 1  p, the condition requires s < 1
8
.
Let PF be the symmetric equilibrium price in the free-recall regime, if a symmetric
equilibrium exists. Suppose for now that this equilibrium price is below the monopoly
price pM , and so a consumer is willing to investigate the rival seller if her initial sellers
o¤er was disappointing. To derive the equilibrium price PF , we need to calculate a sellers
demand if it sets a di¤erent price. Therefore, suppose seller i sets price P while seller j
sets the equilibrium price PF . Consider a buyer who visits seller i rst and nds out match
utility ui. If the buyer purchases immediately, her net surplus is ui P , while if she chooses
to search and visit seller j, her expected net surplus given the anticipated price PF at seller
j is
Euj [maxfui   P; uj   PFg]  s = ui   P + V (ui + PF   P )  s :
If we dene A by
A = V  1(s) ; (27)
then the buyer will buy immediately from seller i if and only if ui  A + P   PF . Here,
A is the threshold match utility which induces immediate purchase when the two sellers
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o¤er the same price.25 If the buyer chooses to investigate the second seller, she will buy
from the seller with the greater net surplus, provided that surplus is non-negative. This
pattern of demand is depicted on Figure 5a below. Note that, unlike the monopoly setting,
here there is always some buy-now demand in symmetric equilibrium (provided s > 0),
i.e., A < umax, since if a buyer nds the highest possible match utility at the rst seller,
she cannot do better at the rival and so will not search.
On the other hand, if a buyer rst visits the rival rm j, this buyer anticipates that
seller i will be o¤ering the equilibrium price PF and so she buys immediately from j if
uj  A, and otherwise she investigates i and then chooses the superior option (if that net
surplus is positive). This case is depicted on Figure 5b. As in the situation with a single
seller, with assumption (2) a sellers buy-now demand that is, the demand from those
consumers who buy on their rst visit to the seller (which includes those consumers who
rst visited the rival and decided to search) is more elastic than its buy-later demand.
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Figure 5: Demand in duopoly with free recall
Given the pattern of demand in Figure 5, it is straightforward to derive the rst-order
condition for the symmetric equilibrium price PF . However, unlike the monopoly setting,
in general it is hard to ensure the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the oligopoly case
25Since V () is a decreasing function, (26) and (27) imply that A is uniquely determined and A > pM .
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with free recall (let alone with more intricate selling strategies).26 For this reason, we often
focus in the following on the particular case of a uniform distribution, where equilibrium
exists in all regimes considered.
By examining Figure 5, one can derive the rst-order condition for the equilibrium free-
recall price PF in the example with Q(p) = 1  p as follows. In the symmetric equilibrium
where each seller sets price PF , each rm has total demand 12(1 P 2F ) since a fraction P 2F of
consumers buy from neither seller. If rm i cuts its price by innitessimal ", all consumers
who buy from it pay less, so it loses "
2
(1   P 2F ). On the other hand, its demand increases
by 1
2
" on Figure 5a and by 1
2
A" on Figure 5b (here 1
2
is because half of the consumers visit
rm i rst and the other half visit rm j rst), and it gains revenue PF from each new
consumer. Thus, the rst-order condition for PF is
1  P 2F = (1 + A)PF : (28)
Provided that A  pM = 12 , as required by (26), the solution to (28) is below pM , and the
equilibrium price falls with A (and so rises with the search cost s). This price is shown as
the dashed line on Figure 6a below.
Unilateral incentives to deter search. Starting from the free-recall equilibrium, each
sellers incentive to introduce a buy-now discount or to require a deposit is as in the
monopoly setting from section 2.2. Consider seller i, say. Suppose it maintains the buy-
now price PF , but unilaterally introduces a buy-later premium  or requires deposit D.
This will not a¤ect the behavior of those consumers who rst meet seller j since they believe
that rm i is o¤ering the free-recall price PF . So we need only consider those buyers who
rst meet seller i. When they rst encounter i, their outside option is the random variable
v = maxf0; uj   PFg. Since our argument in the monopoly setting did not rely on the
form of the distribution for v, the same results hold in the duopoly model.27 That is, with
condition (2), starting from the free-recall equilibrium each rm has a unilateral incentive
to impose a buy-later premium on consumers who return to buy later (or equivalently, o¤er
26One can show that a symmetric equilibrium exists in the free-recall regime, and the rst-order condition
denes the equilibrium price, if pQ(p) is a concave function.
27The proofs will be slightly di¤erent because the outside option now depends on the benchmark equi-
librium price PF , but the logic is the same.
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a buy-now discount to consumers who buy at their rst visit), or require consumers to pay
a deposit to retain the right to buy later. If the stronger condition that Q is concave for
Q > 0 is satised, each rm also has a unilateral incentive to make an exploding o¤er.
Equilibrium search-deterring strategies. In general it appears to be hard to investi-
gate the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with both rms o¤ering a buy-now discount
or a deposit contract, and to compare the market performance with the free-recall regime.
To make progress, we specialize to the case of linear demand Q(p) = 1  p.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium buy-now discounts in duopoly
Consider rst the regime where sellers o¤er buy-now discounts. Figure 6 depicts the
equilibrium outcome as a function of the search cost s. (The details of these derivations
are provided in the appendix.) As shown in Figure 6a below, the use of buy-now discounts
leads to higher prices (the middle solid curve is the buy-now price and the upper solid
curve is the buy-later price). That is, even the discounted buy-now price is higher than
the uniform price, and the ability to o¤er buy-now customers a discount drives up both
prices. (We saw that a similar phenomenon could also arise in the monopoly context.) The
intuition is that the buy-now discount adds to the intrinsic search frictions in the market,
and this allows rms to charge a higher price. For instance, when s = 0 (i.e., when the
market has no intrinsic search frictions), rms generate endogenous search frictions via
their buy-now discount, which in this case is about 12% of the buy-later price. When the
search cost approaches its maximum level which allows search to occur, buy-later demand
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becomes negligible even with free recall, and all prices converge to the monopoly price
pM =
1
2
.
Whether the use of buy-now discounts leads to higher prot depends on the magnitude
of the search cost. Figure 6b shows how industry prots with uniform pricing (the dashed
curve) and with buy-now discounts (the solid curve) vary with the search cost s. Price
discrimination leads to higher prot only if the search cost is small, and for higher search
costs price discrimination leads to high prices which exclude too many consumers. In such
cases, sellers are engaged in a Prisoners Dilemma: an individual seller wishes to o¤er
a buy-now discount, but when both do so industry prots fall. Finally, because of both
higher prices and reduced matching quality between consumers and products, one can show
that aggregate consumer surplus and total welfare fall when rms use buy-now discounts.
(See Figure 9 below.)
Next consider the regime where sellers o¤er deposit contracts. In the uniform example,
the buy-now price P (the upper solid curve in Figure 7a below) is very slightly above the
free-recall price PF . (The lower solid curve is the corresponding buy-later price P   D.)
As in the single-seller case, the almost unchanged price does not mean that consumers pay
the same as they would with free recall. A consumer pays more in this regime, because
with positive probability she pays a deposit to one rm and the whole price to the other.
Figure 7b describes the impact on industry prot, and it shows that rms always earn less
in this regime relative to the free-recall situation.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium deposit contracts in duopoly
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Finally, consider the outcome if sellers cannot commit to their buy-later price if a
buyer does not buy immediately. When consumers face an intrinsic cost of returning to
a previously visited seller, the Diamondargument in the monopoly setting continues to
apply. In particular, as in Proposition 5, if sellers set an initial price on a buyers rst visit
but cannot make any commitment about the future price if she returns later, rms will
exploit those consumers who return to buy later such that the only equilibrium outcome is
that rms set very high buy-later prices and no consumers ever return in equilibrium. The
outcome is as if sellers make exploding o¤ers to their prospective customers. When both
rms make an exploding o¤er, the equilibrium price and prot in the uniform example is
shown as the solid curves in Figure 8. The outcome is again that price is higher when
exploding o¤ers are made but industry prot is lower.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium exploding o¤ers in duopoly
At least in this uniform example, this market performs poorly when sellers can recognize
customers. A seller has unilateral incentive to discriminate against those customers who
wish to buy later, either because they have a strategic reason to deter search, or because
they cannot refrain from exploiting information that a buyer has not found a satisfactory
alternative. Except for a small parameter range in the buy-now discount regime, sellers are
harmed by the use of search deterring strategies. Because of this, sellers might welcome a
consumer protection policy which prevents the use of these tactics, if such regulation was
feasible and applied to all sellers in the market.
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Figure 9: Search deterrence and welfare in four regimes
When sellers pursue these sales tactics, prices rise and search is deterred. As a result
consumers are harmed in two ways: the chosen product is on average a less good match
with their tastes, and they pay more for this product. Figure 9a shows the proportion
of consumers who buy immediately at the rst seller i.e., the fraction of consumers who
do not search in this uniform example. (From top to bottom, the curves correspond to
the regimes with exploding o¤ers, buy-now discounts, deposits, and free recall.) As one
would expect, this fraction increases with the intrinsic search cost s in each case. The
impact of search deterrence is most marked when s is small. Here, few consumers buy
immediately with free recall, since there is usually a chance they will nd a better o¤er
from the rival rm, but with an exploding o¤er 40% of consumers do not search (and this
is despite the fact that the price is higher with exploding o¤ers). Finally, Figure 9b shows
total welfare consumer surplus plus industry prot in the four regimes. (From bottom
to top, the curves correspond to exploding o¤ers, buy-now discounts, deposits, and free
recall.) As is intuitive, these sales tactics cause limited harm in a market with signicant
intrinsic search frictions, since there is then little buy laterdemand even with free recall.
When intrinsic frictions are small, though, the articial search frictions induced by these
tactics can lead to signicant welfare losses.
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4 Conclusions
This paper has examined a sellers incentive to discriminate against those consumers who
return to buy later after investigating rival o¤ers. In general, there are two reasons to
discriminate in this way. The strategic motive reects the sellers incentive to make post-
search purchase di¢ cult in order to deter search. By committing to make it costly to
return, the seller reduces the option value of further search and a buyer is more inclined
to buy without search. The informational motive to discriminate against customers who
buy later reects the relative demand elasticities of the two kinds of buyer. A customer
who deferred purchase has relatively inelastic demand, since she has no other attractive
option to the sellers o¤er. Both motives operate when a seller can commit to its selling
strategy, in which case a seller had an incentive to deter search under mild conditions.
When a seller cannot commit to future prices, only the informational motive is present.
Especially when consumers have an intrinsic cost of returning to the seller, though, this
motive is very powerful, and a sellers incentive to raise its price to post-search buyers is so
strong that no consumer ever returns once she leaves the seller. Search deterrence is then
a by-product of the sellers incentive to set prices which reect demand elasticities.
This analysis could usefully be extended in a number of directions. In this paper, search
deterrence required that a seller be able to recognize its customers. However, one could
investigate if other selling techniques can protably deter search even when consumers are
anonymous. Flash sales, or very short-run discounts, are a common marketing tactic, and
a number of daily dealwebsites operate on the internet.28 A discount which is known
to be short-lived can deter search, since consumers may be unable to take advantage of it
if they take the time needed to search.
A second limitation of the model is that a seller had no information ex ante about the
realization of the buyers outside option. If the seller has information about the outside
option which is bad for the consumer, it may disclose that information to deter search. For
example, a gas station might display a sign stating last fuel for 20 miles, or cheapest
fuel in town. (The credibility of such statements will determine how consumers react to
28For instance, in May 2011 a supplier of cosmetic surgery placed a deal on Groupon which o¤ered
surgery worth £ 5,000 for £ 1,999 if a consumer agreed on that day to the procedure.
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them.) On the other hand, a seller who knows the outside option is likely to be attractive
might make an exploding o¤er to prevent its discovery by the buyer. When a sellers choice
of buy-later policy is made contingent on its knowledge of the outside option, a savvy buyer
might use the sellers policy as a signal of her outside option.
The analysis in this paper suggests that search deterrence plausibly leads to signicant
welfare losses. Articial search frictions drive up prices and reduce the quality of the match
between product and consumer. These two kinds of harm can induce fewer consumers to
buy, with the result that sellers in equilibrium can also be harmed when these sales tactics
are feasible. Public policy might attempt to limit the use of such tactics. For instance,
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, adopted in 2005 across the European Union,
prohibits sellers in all circumstances falsely stating that a product will only be available
for a very limited time, or that it will only be available on particular terms for a very
limited time, in order to elicit an immediate decision and deprive consumers of su¢ cient
opportunity or time to make an informed choice.29 Nevertheless, the enforcement of such
policies will inevitably be di¢ cult given the casual nature of much sales interaction and
the frequency with which discounts from regular prices are o¤ered. A less direct method to
control aggressive sales techniques is to require a cooling o¤period for specied products,
as is currently done in many jurisdictions. If a salesman manages to convince a consumer
to buy immediately, through whatever means, the consumer then has the ability to cancel
the deal within a specied period if she discovers a better deal elsewhere.
APPENDIX: Proofs and Omitted Analysis
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) It su¢ ces to show that (p)  pqF (p) is strictly decreasing in
p for p 2 [pM ; umax). Assumption (2) implies that Q0=Q is strictly decreasing and that
prot pQ(p) is single-peaked. The latter observation implies that p   Q(p)=Q0(p) for
29The word false is di¢ cult here, as it suggests that a seller is permitted to make an exploding o¤er
(say), provided that the seller sticks to the promise not to sell if the buyer attempts to buy later.
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p 2 [pM ; umax). Thus, when p 2 [pM ; umax) we have
0(p) = Ev[Q(p+ minfv; ag)] + pEv[Q0(p+ minfv; ag)]
 Ev[Q(p+ minfv; ag)] + Q(p) Q0(p)Ev[Q
0(p+ minfv; ag)]
< Ev[Q(p+ minfv; ag)] + Q(p) Q0(p)Ev[
Q0(p)
Q(p)
Q(p+ minfv; a)] = 0 :
The rst inequality follows from p   Q(p)=Q0(p), and the second follows from the obser-
vation that Q0=Q is strictly decreasing.
(ii) Let us rst consider the case with a + PF < umax, so that there is some buy-now
demand at the free-recall price PF . From Figure 1 we can see that when a + p < umax,
the rm has a positive buy-now demand N(p)  Q(a + p), while its buy-later demand is
L(p)  R a
0
[Q(p + v)   Q(p + a)]dG(v).30 We show that buy-now demand N(p) is more
elastic than buy-later demand L(p). To see this, note that
 pL
0
L
<  pN
0
N
, LN 0 < NL0 , Q0(p+a)
Z a
0
Q(p+v)dG(v) < Q(p+a)
Z a
0
Q0(p+v)dG(v) :
But since Q is strictly log-concave we have Q0(p+ a)Q(p+ v) < Q(p+ a)Q0(p+ v) for all
v < a, which establishes the claim. Since PF maximizes p(N(p) +L(p)), an average of the
elasticities of N(p) and L(p) at p = PF is equal to one. Since L(p) is less elastic than N(p),
PF satises
Q(a+ PF ) + PFQ
0(a+ PF ) < 0 ;
provided there is positive buy-now demand at PF . The log-concavity of Q then implies
that PF > p^.
If a+PF  umax, there is no buy-now demand and we cannot apply the above argument.
However, since p^ maximizes pQ(a+ p), condition (5) implies that p^ < umax  a if umax > a
and p^ = 0 if umax = a. So p^ < PF given PF > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: In the text, we derived the optimal sales policy within the
restricted class of mechanisms involving a buy-now price together with a menu of deposit
contracts. Here, we show how no more general mechanism can do better for the seller. To
prove this claim, we formulate the optimal mechanism design problem.
30When v has a mass point at zero, L(p)  R a
0+
[Q(p + v)   Q(p + a)]g(v)dv + G(0)[Q(p)   Q(p + a)].
The following argument still works in this case.
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Consider a two-stage direct mechanism consisting of the functions fx(u0); (q0(u0); t0(u0));
(q(u0; v0); t(u0; v0))g. In the rst stage, the buyer is required to report her valuation for the
sellers product, u0. She will then be instructed whether to cease her search or whether to
investigate the outside option. With probability x(u0), she is instructed to stop searching,
in which case the buyer pays t0(u0) and obtains the product with probability q0(u0). With
probability 1  x(u0), she is instructed to investigate the outside option. In that event she
is required to report her new private information, i.e., the realization of the outside option,
v0. Then contingent on the two reports, the buyer pays t(u0; v0) and obtains the product
from the seller with probability q(u0; v0).
Dene
U(u; u0; v; v0)  maxfu; vgq(u0; v0) + v(1  q(u0; v0))  t(u0; v0)  s : (29)
This is the type-(u; v) buyers expected surplus if she is instructed to search for the outside
option after reporting u0 in the rst stage, and if she reports v0 in the second stage. (Notice
that if the buyer obtains both the product and the outside option, she consumes the
better one.) According to the revelation principle in a dynamic setting (Myerson, 1986),
without loss of generality we can focus on direct mechanisms such that (i) the buyer
reports truthfully in the second stage if she has been truthful in the rst stage and has
been instructed to search, so that
U(u; u; v; v) = max
v0
: U(u; u; v; v0) ; (30)
and (ii) the buyer reports truthfully in the rst stage, so that
(u)  x(u)[uq0(u)  t0(u)] + (1  x(u))Ev[U(u; u; v; v)]
= max
u0
: x(u0)[uq0(u0)  t0(u0)] + (1  x(u0))Ev[max
v0
U(u; u0; v; v0)] : (31)
Note that if the buyer has lied in the rst stage (u0 6= u), she is able and in general has
an incentive to lie again in the second stage (so v0 6= v).31 Here, (u) dened in (31) is
31In the literature on sequential screening, a strong truthtelling condition is often imposed, which
requires that the agent reports truthfully even if she previously lied. For example, see Courty and Li
(2000), Krahmer and Strausz (2011), and section 5 of Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012). This is because
in their settings, an agents reporting incentives depend only on her previous reports, but not on whether
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the buyers surplus from participating in the mechanism. It is clear that  is an increasing
function, and one can also show it is convex. From (31), the envelope theorem implies that
0(u) = x(u)q0(u) + (1  x(u)) @
@u
Ev[U(u; u0; v; v)]

u0=u
= x(u)q0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
q(u; v)dG(v) ; (32)
where the second equality follows the denition of U in (29) which implies @
@u
U(u; u0; v; v) =
q(u0; v) if u > v, and @
@u
U(u; u0; v; v) = 0 otherwise.
The sellers problem is to choose fx; q0; t0; q; tg in order to maximize protZ umax
0
fx(u)t0(u) + (1  x(u))Ev[t(u; v)]gdF (u)
subject to the pair of incentive constraints (30)(31) and the participation constraint
(u)  v   s. (It is without loss of generality to assume that the seller o¤ers a mech-
anism which is accepted by all agents in equilibrium, as the non-participation option can
be made available within the mechanism.)
In the following, we rst solve a relaxedproblem by imposing the participation con-
straint together with only the local incentive compatibility constraint (32). We will then
show that the solution to this relaxed problem is the optimal menu of deposit contracts
described in Proposition 4, which therefore constitute the optimal selling mechanism.
From the denition of (u) in (31), we have
x(u)t0(u) + (1  x(u))Ev[t(u; v)] =
x(u)uq0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
(u  v)q(u; v)dG(v) + v   s

  (u) : (33)
Therefore, the sellers prot can be written as
 =
Z umax
0

x(u)uq0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
(u  v)q(u; v)dG(v) + v   s

  (u)

dF (u) :
those reports were truthful. Using our notation, this would be the case if U did not depend on the true u.
In such cases, the incentive for a type-u0 buyer to report truthfully in the second stage on the equilibrium
path implies that a type-u buyer will report truthfully in the second stage even after reporting u0 (rather
than u) in the rst stage. Because of this di¤erence we cannot impose the strong truthtelling constraint
in our model. Without a strong truthtelling constraint, the incentive compatibility condition in the rst
stage is more complicated than in the usual case since we need to consider the optimal lying strategy in
the second stage.
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Using Z umax
0
(u)dF (u) = (0) +
Z umax
0
0(u)[1  F (u)]du
and (32), we can rewrite this prot asZ umax
0

x(u)(u)q0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
((u)  v)q(u; v)dG(v) + v   s

dF (u)  (0) ;
(34)
where  is given in (18).
This expression can be maximized point-wise with respect to x, q0 and q, where each
of these probabilities is constrained to lie between 0 and 1. This entails that q0(u) = 1 if
and only if (u)  0, i.e., if u  pM . This also entails
q(u; v) =

1 if v  (u)
0 otherwise
: (35)
In particular, both q0 and q are zero when u < pM , and in this range the buyer never
obtains the product. From (34), in this range it is therefore optimal to set x(u) = 0. Using
q(u; v) in (35) we obtainZ u
0
[((u)  v)q(u; v)]dG(v) =
Z (u)
0
[(u)  v]dG(v) = R((u)) :
Hence, the sellers prot (34) simplies to
 =
Z umax
pM
[x(u)(u) + (1  x(u)) fR((u)) + v   sg] dF (u) +F (pM)(v  s) (0) : (36)
From (12) we know that R((u)) = S((u))+(u) v, and so the fg term in the integrand
is greater than (u) if (u)  a = S 1(s), so that it is optimal to set x(u) = 0 if (u)  a
and otherwise to set x(u) = 1. As in the text, write u^ > pM for the utility level which
satises (u^) = a. Together with the participation constraint (0) = v   s, this implies
that prot in (36) is
 =
Z u^
pM
[R((u)) + v   s] dF (u) +
Z umax
u^
(u)dF (u)  (1  F (pM))(v   s) : (37)
Since Z umax
u^
(u)dF (u) = u^(1  F (u^)) ;
we see that prot in (37) is the same as in our earlier expression (19).
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In sum, the maximum prots obtained in this relaxed problem, which are an upper
bound on possible prots when we impose all incentive constraints, are the same as those
achieved with our restricted instruments of a buy-now price together with a menu of deposit
contracts. We can conclude that the sellers optimal selling strategy is as described in the
statement of Proposition 4.
Details for the uniform example without commitment
If the seller o¤ers the buy-now price P , for given consumer expectations about the
buy-later price pe, there will be an equilibrium threshold u^  1 such that all buyers with
u  u^ will buy immediately, while others will search.32 (Note that pe and u^ will depend
on the buy-now price P .) Given this threshold u^, the seller chooses its buy-later price p
to maximize its prots from the pool of searching consumers. A buyer who searches will
buy from the seller if u   p  v, where p is the sellers actual buy-later price. Therefore,
the sellers buy-later demand with price p < u^ is 1
2
(u^  p)2, and so p is chosen to maximize
1
2
p(u^ p)2, which entails p = 1
3
u^. The seller then makes prot 2
27
u^3 in the buy-later market.
If all consumers choose to search (u^ = 1), the seller chooses the buy-later price p = 1
3
.
The buyer with type u^ is by construction indi¤erent between buying immediately at
price P and searching with the option to buy later at the anticipated price pe, so that
u^  P = Ev[maxfu^  pe; vg]  s = 12(1 + (u^  pe)2)  118 = 12(1 + (23 u^)2)  118 ; (38)
where the third equality follows from the equilibrium requirement that pe = 1
3
u^. Note that
if 1 P  Ev[maxf1  13 ; vg]  118 , i.e., if P  13 , then even the buyer with the highest u will
prefer to search and have the option of buying later at price p = 1
3
. Thus, for P  1
3
there
will be no buy-now demand, and the seller then sets p = 1
3
to serve the buy-later market,
thereby obtaining prot 2
27
. However, we see next that the seller can do better than this
by inducing some buy-now demand.
Given an initial price P  1
3
, the relevant solution to equation (38) is u^(P ) = 9
4
 
1
4
p
49  72P . The resulting buy-later price p = 1
3
u^(P ) is greater than P when P  1
3
,
so that a buy-later premium is imposed. Here, u^(P ) increases with P , so that a higher
32Suppose given initial price P that buyers anticipate the buy-later price pe. They will buy immediately
if and only if u P  Ev[maxfu  pe; vg]  s, and this inequality holds if and only if u is su¢ ciently large.
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buy-now price induces fewer buyers to buy immediately. If the seller chooses initial price
P  1
3
, its prot is
 = P (1  u^(P )) + 2
27
(u^(P ))3 :
Maximizing this expression with respect to P , and calculating the corresponding buy-later
price p, yields the outcome reported in the text.
Equilibrium analysis in the duopoly model.
(i) Buy-now discounts. Here we derive the symmetric equilibrium tari¤ (P; ), where
P is the buy-now price and  is the buy-later premium (so the buy-later price is P +
). Suppose rm i deviates to (Pi;  i). It is without loss of generality that we consider
deviations restricted to  i  V (P )  s.33 For a buyer who visits rm i rst and values its
product at ui, her surplus is ui   Pi if she buys immediately. If she chooses to search and
visit rm j, her expected surplus is
Euj [maxfui   (Pi +  i); uj   Pg]  s = ui   (Pi +  i) + V (ui   (Pi +  i) + P )  s :
Therefore, this buyer will buy immediately if and only if  i > V (ui   (Pi +  i) + P )   s,
i.e., if ui > V  1(s+  i)+  i+Pi P . If she visits both sellers, she will return to buy from i
if ui  (Pi +  i) > uj  P . The pattern of demand for these consumers who rst visit seller
i is depicted on Figure A1(a). Consumers who rst visit seller j hold equilibrium beliefs
about rm is pricing strategy, and so their demand is as shown on Figure A1(b).
With the help of these gures, one can write down the rst-order conditions for (P; )
to be the equilibrium tari¤. In the uniform example we have V  1(x) = 1 p2x. As in the
monopoly case, in this example a sellers total demand does not depend on its choice of
buy-later premium  i and its buy-later demand does not depend on its choice of buy-now
price Pi. As a result, a sellers prot is additively separable in  i and Pi. It is apparent from
Figure A1 that in symmetric equilibrium a fraction P (P + ) of consumers buy nothing,
and so a sellers total demand is 1
2
(1   P (P + )). Similarly to (28), then, the rst-order
condition for the buy-now price P is
1  P (P + ) = (1 + V  1(s+ ) + )P :
33As can be seen from Figure A1(a), when  i > V (P )  s, buy-later demand disappears and is prot is
independent of  i. Hence, our restriction to  i  V (P )  s is without loss of generality.
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Since a sellers choice of  i does not a¤ect its total demand, but only the proportion of
buy-later demand, a seller chooses  i to maximize its revenue from the consumers who buy
later. Figure A1(a) implies that the volume of seller is buy-later demand is proportional
to (V  1(s+  i))2   P 2, and so the rst-order condition for the buy-later premium  is
(V  1(s+ ))2   P 2 =  2V  1(s+ )(V  1)0(s+ ) :
Numerically solving this pair of rst-order conditions yields the prices and prots shown
on Figure 6 in the text.
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Figure A1: Demand in duopoly with a buy-now discount
(ii) Deposit contracts. Here we derive the symmetric equilibrium deposit contract
(P;D), where P is the buy-now price and D is the deposit (so the buy-later price is
p = P  D). Suppose seller i deviates to (Pi; Di). For a buyer who visits i rst and values
its product at ui, her surplus is ui   Pi if she buys immediately. If she does not buy but
pays the deposit Di and continues to search, her expected surplus is
Euj [maxfui   (Pi  Di); uj   Pg] Di   s = ui   Pi + V (ui   (Pi  Di) + P )  s :
Therefore, this buyer will buy immediately if and only if ui   (Pi   Di) + P > A. The
buyer can also abandon seller i by not paying the deposit and then investigating the rival.
In that case, her expected surplus is just V (P )   s. Similarly to (12) in the single-seller
setting, given the equilibrium buy-now price P dene
W (x)  V (x) + x  V (P )  P =
Z x
P
F (u)du :
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Then paying the deposit is preferred to abandoning seller i altogether ifW (ui (Pi Di)+
P )  Di, i.e., if
ui > W
 1(Di) + Pi  Di   P :
After paying the deposit and visiting j, the buyer will return to buy from i if uj   P <
ui   (Pi  Di). If the buyer abandons seller i, she will buy from j if uj  P .
Therefore, the pattern of demand of those consumers who rst visit seller i is described
in Figure A2(a). This demand pattern assumesDi < W (A), so that there is some buy-later
demand, as is the case in equilibrium for the uniform example. Note that W 1(Di) > P
if Di > 0, as shown on Figure A2(a). Consumers who rst visit seller j hold equilibrium
beliefs about seller is pricing strategy. Following the same logic as above, their demand
pattern is as shown on Figure A2(b).
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Figure A2: Demand in duopoly with a deposit contract
With the help of these gures, one can write down the rst-order conditions for (P;D) to
be the equilibrium deposit contract. In the uniform example, a sellers prot is additively
separable in Pi and Di and its demand does not depend on Di. We have W 1(D) =p
2D + P 2 and A = 1 p2s. It is apparent from Figure A2 that in symmetric equilibrium
a fraction P (W 1(D)   D) of consumers buy nothing, and so a sellers total demand in
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equilibrium is 1
2
(1  P (W 1(D) D)). Similarly to (28), the rst-order condition for the
buy-now price P is
1  P (W 1(D) D) = (1 + A D)P , P (1 + A+ P 2 + x  x2) = 1 ;
where we have written x  W 1(D). Since a sellers choice of Di does not a¤ect its total
demand, it chooses Di to maximize its revenue from the consumers who pay the deposit
but who do not end up buying. Figure A2(a) implies that the number of these consumers
is proportional to (A W 1(Di))(2  A W 1(Di)). If we write x = W 1(Di), then the
seller chooses x to maximize W (x)(A  x)(2  A  x) which has rst-order condition
(A2 + P 2   2A)x+ 3x2   2x3 = P 2 :
Solving this pair of rst-order conditions yields the prices and prots shown on Figure 7
in the text.
(iii) Exploding o¤ers. Finally, we examine the equilibrium prices when exploding o¤ers
are made. Suppose the equilibrium price is P . If seller i deviates and sets price Pi, its
total demand is
1
2
Q(Pi + V (P )  s) + 12 [1 Q(P + V (P )  s)]Q(Pi) : (39)
Here, the rst term represents demand from those consumers who rst visit seller i: if they
have match utility ui, they will accept is exploding o¤er if ui Pi  V (P ) s. The second
term is the demand from those consumers who rst visit the rival: a consumer will reject
the rivals exploding o¤er if uj   P < V (P )   s, since they anticipate that seller i o¤ers
the equilibrium price P , and then they buy from i if ui  Pi.
In the uniform example, demand in (39) is linear in Pi, and the rst-order condition
for equilibrium price P is
Q(P + V (P )  s) + [1 Q(P + V (P )  s)]Q(P ) = P (2 Q(P + V (P )  s))
or
P (2  2s+ P 2) = 1
after substituting V (P ) = 1
2
(1 P )2. Solving this rst-order condition yields the price and
prot shown on Figure 8 in the text.
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